Health by McInnes, Colin
Aberystwyth University
Health
McInnes, Colin
Published in:
Security Studies: An Introduction
Publication date:
2008
Citation for published version (APA):
McInnes, C. (2008). Health. In P. D. Williams (Ed.), Security Studies: An Introduction (pp. 274-286). Taylor &
Francis. http://hdl.handle.net/2160/1911
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Aberystwyth Research Portal (the Institutional Repository) are
retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the
legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Aberystwyth Research Portal for the purpose of private study or
research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Aberystwyth Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
tel: +44 1970 62 2400
email: is@aber.ac.uk
Download date: 09. Jul. 2020
Colin McInnes, Security Studies: An Introduction, ed., Paul Williams (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 
2008), pp. 274-286. 
 
CHAPTER 19 – HEALTH [1] 
CONTENTS  
 Introduction  
 Health as a security issue  
 The spreads of infectious disease  
 HIV/AIDS as a security issue  
 Bioterrorism  
 A not so perfect partnership?  
 Conclusion  
 
Abstract  
In this chapter, students will learn why health has not traditionally been seen as a security issue and 
why this began to change. They will look at the main health issues on the security agenda: the 
spread of infectious disease, especially to the West; the impact of HIV/AIDS, especially on state 
stability; and the risk of bio-terrorism. Questions which arise include whether some of these risks 
have been overstated, whose interests are being served by securitizing health, and whether health 
should be a concern for security policy or development policy.  
 
Introduction  
At the end of 2006, UNAIDS estimated that 39.5 million people were living with HIV/AIDS. In that 
year alone, between 2.5 million and 3.5 million were believed to have died from AIDS-related 
illnesses, while an additional 4.3 million people had been infected with the disease.[2] The estimate 
of AIDS-related deaths is roughly double that of a decade ago, and is likely to double again by 2030. 
The scale of suffering caused by this single illness is immense and the number of deaths dwarves 
that of more traditional security crises such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, or the War on Terror. 
Moreover, HIV/AIDS is only one of a number of communicable diseases, many of which are 
preventable, which each year kill millions of people. These include long-established diseases such as 
malaria and TB as well as new diseases such as SARS and H5N1, which threaten to become global 
pandemics with the potential to kill millions in a relatively short space of time. Further, non-
communicable diseases such as tobacco-related illnesses and cardio-vascular disease again kill 
millions each year – indeed, tobacco-related diseases account for more deaths each year than any 
other non-natural cause. In sum, the lives and livelihood of the overwhelming majority of people on 
this planet are at greater risk from disease than from war, terrorism or other forms of violent 
conflict. But does this make global health a security issue? Indeed, given the links between poor 
health and poverty, is global health more properly a subject for development studies than 
International Relations? And should it be the focus of government ministries such as the Department 
for International Development in the UK, rather than the Foreign Office or Ministry of Defence?  
          For much of the past 50 years the relationship between health and security has been limited 
and unidirectional: conflict has caused health problems. These problems have been both a direct 
result of conflict (largely in the form of combat casualties) and indirect (e.g. the destruction of 
infrastructure affecting the ability of hospitals to keep working, increased prevalence of water-borne 
diseases as a result of disruption to the water supply, refugee flows leading to the spread of 
infectious disease or the overburdening of public health systems). But this was not always the case. 
In the nineteenth century, as trade between Europe and the rest of the world increased, so did the 
risk of infectious disease being brought into Europe from elsewhere. Disease was viewed as an 
exogenous threat which had to be dealt with by means of international cooperation and the 
introduction of internationally agreed health regulations. Thus the origins of international 
cooperation on public health lie in the security concerns of Europe in the nineteenth century. After 
the Second World War however, this relationship disappeared for two main reasons. First, health 
was presented not as a security issue but as a human right. This move was seen in the constitution 
establishing the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1948 and reached its high point in the 1970s 
with the WHO’s ‘Health for All’ initiative. Second, during this period the perception grew that 
infectious diseases were being conquered, especially through the use of antibiotics. The number of 
deaths in the West from infectious diseases fell dramatically in the early decades following the 
Second World War, while in the late 1960s for the first time in history a major infectious disease, 
smallpox, was effectively eradicated. These successes prompted the US Surgeon General in the late 
1960s to declare (perhaps apocryphally) that communicable disease had been conquered, at least 
for the West. What was patently clear was that this was not the case elsewhere, where living 
conditions and levels of poverty were much worse. Therefore global health became for the West less 
of a security concern than one of development.  
          By the late 1990s however this had begun to change. Two examples of this are the 1999 US 
National Intelligence Estimate on the global threat of infectious disease to the United States, and the 
January 2000 meeting of the UN Security Council on HIV/AIDS. On the first, in 1999 the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) identified a number of risks to US security arising from infectious disease, 
risks exacerbated by rapid globalization and the increased movement of goods and people. These 
included not only risks to US citizens travelling abroad, but to citizens in the US itself given the 
potential ease with which diseases could spread internationally as a result of travel and trade. 
Crucially however the CIA went further than this, arguing that infectious disease also posed a risk to 
international stability and to economic growth, placing it firmly in the territory of national security 
(CIA 2000). On the second, at its first meeting of the new millennium, the UN Security Council 
discussed the threat of HIV/AIDS to Africa and in Resolution 1308 warned ‘that the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security’. In particular the Security Council 
drew attention to the effects of HIV/AIDS on social stability and on peacekeeping missions.[3] This 
debate raised the global political stakes on HIV/AIDS, and in subsequent years HIV/AIDS was framed 
not only as a humanitarian catastrophe but as a risk to national security and international stability. In 
the early years of the twenty-first century, health issues began to appear in statements from foreign 
and security ministers, while global health was discussed at a number of G8 summits, including 
Genoa, Gleneagles and St Petersburg, in the context both of humanitarianism and security. By the 
middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century a variety of health issues were therefore 
beginning to appear on the foreign and security agendas of Western states. Why was this?  
 
Health as a security issue  
Two factors facilitated the emergence of health as a security issue. The first of these was the 
growing acceptance during the 1990s of a broadened security agenda. The end of the Cold War saw 
security analysts shift their focus away from threats, especially military threats, to more diffuse risks. 
This opened the door for a more eclectic range of issues to be considered as security concerns. 
Further, the shift from threat to risk allowed security’s focus to shift from the idea of a ‘clear and 
present danger’ to more probabilistic assessments of potential hazards. Both of these moves opened 
up a space whereby public health issues could be raised as security concerns. Moreover, questions 
were raised not only over the security agenda – those issues which were to be considered as security 
concerns – but also over the referent object: whose security was to be protected? Whereas the Cold 
War had prioritized national security, in the post-Cold War world global and human security began 
to be considered as legitimate concerns. Although definitions of human security varied, the very idea 
that risks to the individual from macro-level developments could be part of the security agenda 
again allowed a space for the inclusion of health as a security issue. After all, individuals generally 
were more likely to be at risk from new infectious diseases spread as a consequence of globalization 
than from ethnic conflict, environmental disasters or terrorism.  
          The second facilitating factor was human agency. A number of prominent individuals used their 
positions of power and influence to place health on the foreign and security policy agenda. Two 
examples of this are the former head of the World Health Organization, Gro Harlem Brundtland and 
President Clinton’s ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke. As WHO’s Director General, 
Brundtland emphasized the changing nature of public health in a globalized world, and argued that 
global public health could not be divorced from broader social and political trends.  
          Significantly it was during Brundtland’s tenure that WHO coined the term ‘global health 
security’. The second example of individual agency is that of Richard Holbrooke, who is widely 
acknowledged as a key player in the securitization of HIV/AIDS. According to Barnett and Prins 
(2006: 360), when visiting Africa in 1999 Holbrooke realized not only the scale of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic but also that existing aid-based approaches were failing to deal with the crisis. Moreover 
the potential social consequences of the pandemic were beginning to become apparent, including 
state instability. On his return to New York, Holbrooke was instrumental in placing HIV/AIDS on the 
Security Council’s agenda. What is unclear is whether Holbrooke saw his actions as motivated solely 
by security concerns, or whether he saw the securitization of HIV/AIDS as a way of achieving greater 
political prominence and global action to help deal with the crisis. This potential for the 
securitization of health to act as a Trojan Horse for greater attention and assistance to the most 
needy is an important theme in the debate over health and security.  
          Neither the broadening of the security agenda nor individual agency however can explain the 
emergence of health as a security issue. If it was simply a by-product of the broadening agenda, then 
this move would have been  
 BOX 19.1 BRUNDTLAND ON GLOBAL HEALTH AND SECURITY 
In a speech to the US Council on Foreign Relations in 1999, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director of the 
World Heath Organization, argued that ‘With globalization – on which *the US’s+ prosperity so much 
depends – all of humankind today paddles in a single microbial sea – and we have to conclude: there 
are no health sanctuaries. . . . The levels of ill-health in countries constituting a majority of the 
world’s population pose a direct threat to their own national economic and political viability, and 
therefore to the global economic and political interests of the United States and all other countries. 
Territorial dispute is no longer the prime source of conflict. It is increasingly rooted in human misery, 
aftermaths of humanitarian crises, shortage of food and water and the spreading of poverty and ill-
health. So investing in global health is investing in national security. (Brundtland 1999)  
 
expected in the early to mid-1990s when the broadened agenda was being developed, not the late 
1990s/early twenty-first century when it did eventually appear. And agents cannot act successfully 
without issues of substance with which to make their case. Rather three substantive health issues 
contributed to the emergence of health on the security agenda: the spread of infectious disease; the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic; and bio-terrorism. Moreover, these three issues continue to dominate the 
thinking of security analysts with regard to health, though not necessarily public health specialists.  
 
The spread of infectious disease  
New infectious diseases have been emerging at an accelerated rate over recent years, averaging one 
a year for more than two decades. These new diseases include HIV/AIDS, SARS and H5N1, all of 
whose impact has been, or has the potential to be global in nature. Although this phenomenon of 
increased numbers of new diseases may be a by-product of the increased speed of movement of 
goods and people and their interaction over wider geographical areas, it may also be that changes 
are occurring in the microbial world which are independent of these social forces. In addition to new 
diseases, previously contained diseases have begun to spread and have been seen in the West. Over 
the past decade, for example, the USA saw its first cases of ebola, West Nile virus and monkeypox. 
Finally, new strains of diseases are appearing which are resistant to existing drugs, including 
antibiotics. Perhaps the most serious of these is TB, with cities such as New York already 
experiencing epidemics of this new form of the disease.[4]  
          But why have these developments triggered concerns in the security community? There are 
broadly three reasons for this. First, the spread of these diseases could pose a direct threat to the 
health and well-being of the very people that states are there to protect, and for the first time in 
perhaps half a  
 
 
BOX 19.2 INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND GLOBALIZATION: SARS  
The outbreak of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) in 2002 to 2003 is a good example of the 
extent and speed with which new diseases can spread. The disease appears to have originated in 
Guandong province in southern China in November 2002 and began to spread internationally in 
February 2003. The World Health Organization issued global alerts on 12 and 15 March 2003, by 
which time the disease had already spread from China to Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam and Canada. 
By the time the disease came under control in August 2003, 8,422 cases had been identified in 29 
countries with 908 fatalities (WHO 2003).  
 
century, this includes the populations of Western states. Estimates of the impact of an outbreak of 
avian flu transmitted from human to human suggest that perhaps 25–30 per cent of people living in 
the West could contract the disease, with perhaps 300,000 in the UK dying.[5] Infectious disease 
therefore poses an exogenous threat to the people of a state. Second, a pandemic may cause social 
disruption and threaten the stability of a state: confidence in the state may be reduced if it cannot 
provide a basic level of protection against disease; social inequalities may be highlighted as the rich 
or privileged obtain access to better drugs or healthcare, potentially leading to public disorder; if 
large numbers of people die or are unwilling/unable to go to work, public services may be placed at 
risk threatening the functioning of a state; violence and disorder may appear if the authorities 
become unable to cope and if groups feel they have nothing to lose. Thus a state may begin to fail 
threatening its own security. Moreover, as the US National Security Strategy put it, ‘America [and 
the West] is threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones’ (White House 2002: 
1). Third, a large-scale epidemic may also contribute to economic decline by: forcing increased 
government spending on health as a percentage of GDP; reducing productivity due to worker 
absenteeism and the loss of skilled personnel; reducing investment (internal and external) due to a 
lack of business confidence; and by raising insurance costs for health provision. For the state 
involved, the costs may be highly significant, but in a globalized world the effects may be felt around 
the world. The relatively short-lived SARS outbreak of 2002 to 2003 led to less than a thousand 
deaths – individually tragic but, compared to annual deaths from HIV/AIDS, TB or malaria, 
statistically relatively insignificant; but the loss in trade and investment was calculated to be as much 
as $100 billion for the economies in Asia. The macro-economic effects of a major epidemic may 
therefore be very significant, threatening to make the relatively affluent poor and the already poor 
poorer, with a consequent impact upon the ability of states and individuals to provide for their 
security and well-being.  
 
HIV/AIDS as a security issue  
The HIV/AIDS pandemic has not only led to widespread humanitarian concerns, but – uniquely for a 
single disease – has been identified as a security issue, most significantly by the UN Security Council. 
The claims made in 2000 by the Security Council in Resolution 1308 have set the agenda for the 
subsequent debate on HIV/AIDS as a national security issue: that HIV/AIDS poses a risk to stability, to 
uniformed militaries and to peacekeepers, and that the spread of HIV/AIDS is exacerbated by 
conditions of violence. On the first of these, the effects of the disease on economies and on 
governance have been consistently highlighted. HIV/AIDS poses particularly severe economic 
problems due to the cumulative effects of the disease over a number of years; because its full 
effects are postponed as those infected become ill only gradually but then pose an increasing 
economic burden on society; and because of its disproportionate impact upon workers in what 
should be the most productive period of their lives (ICG 2001: 9–13, UN Secretariat 2003: xiii–xiv). 
Such economic decline may increase income inequalities and poverty, exacerbating or creating social 
and political unrest. HIV/AIDS may also lead to social and political problems. HIV infection rates are 
unusually high among skilled professionals (including civil servants, teachers, police and health 
workers) and young adults, threatening ‘the very fibre of what constitutes a nation’ (ICG 2001: 1). 
Democratic development may be harmed if societies become polarized as a consequence of 
HIV/AIDS, if disaffection with the political process sets in, or as a consequence of aid-dependency. 
The stigma of AIDS may also lead to exclusion from work and/or society, creating alienation, fatalism 
and anger among people, especially young people, living with HIV/AIDS. These people may become 
prone to criminal violence or to following violent leaders (CIA 2000, Justice Africa 2004).  
          The second concern focuses on the high rates of HIV infection among security forces, including 
the military – typically cited as being up to five times that of the general population. In sub-Saharan 
Africa in particular, infection rates among the military are often cited as being especially high, with a 
number of militaries experiencing rates above 50 per cent, those of Malawi and Zimbabwe believed 
to be in the order of 75–80 per cent, and elements of the South African military believed to be 
perhaps 90 per cent. Moreover, during periods of conflict it is believed that the risk of infection may 
be as much as 50–100 times that of the civilian population. The consequences of this include its 
impact on combat readiness and military performance. Of particular concern appears to be the 
potential loss of experienced military and technical specialists with 8–15 years service, the ‘middle 
management’ and technical glue which holds an organization together. Morale may also deteriorate 
as workloads are increased to cover for the ill; as the progressive deterioration of comrades due to 
AIDS is witnessed; or due to the fear of infection and the stigma associated with it. The pool of 
recruits may diminish as HIV+ youngsters are turned away, while the cost of treating those in the 
military may pose a major burden on defence budgets. If military effectiveness is reduced as a result 
of HIV/AIDS, or even if it is perceived to have been affected, then states may be at greater risk from 
internal conflict or external aggression. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that conflicts 
may be prolonged either to defer the return of HIV positive troops, or to enable them to gain 
sufficient money (legally or otherwise) to allow them to purchase anti-retroviral drugs to combat the 
disease (Elbe 2002, 2003, Heinecken 2003, ICG 2001, UNAIDS 2003).  
          The third concern is the impact of HIV/AIDS on peacekeeping. Peacekeepers may be at 
increased risk from HIV since many of the world’s conflicts are in regions with a high prevalence of 
HIV. They may also act as vectors for the spread of the disease, especially since the top 10 
contributory nations to peacekeeping operations include states with high HIV prevalence rates (such 
as Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana), as well as a number perceived to be at high risk (such as Ukraine, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and India) (UNAIDS 2003: 6). HIV may also make it difficult for some armies to 
deploy peacekeeping forces, especially at short notice. In particular the attempt to devolve 
peacekeeping to regional powers may be hamstrung by high HIV prevalence, particularly among key 
African armies such as South Africa and Nigeria (Elbe 2002, Heinecken 2003).  
          Finally, there is a concern that conflict acts as a vector for the spread of HIV/AIDS. Soldiers, 
already a high-risk group, are willing to engage in even more risky behaviour in conflict regions; 
incidents of sexual violence increase in conflict; combat injuries may be treated in the field with 
infected blood; health education and surveillance may be poor in zones of conflict; soldiers returning 
from conflicts may bring HIV with them; conflicts create migration which may facilitate the spread of 
HIV; and refugee camps may have poor health education and access to condoms, but are also areas 
where sexual violence is rife. In addition, HIV/AIDS may act as a disincentive to end conflicts because 
of fears that troops from low prevalence areas may act as a Trojan Horse for the spread of the 
disease on their return (UNAIDS 2003).  
          By the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century however, the evidence supporting 
these four concerns had begun to appear less clear cut, more complex and case sensitive. For 
example, evidence began to appear that conflict might also constrain the spread of HIV/AIDS by 
limiting the ability of people to move; with the exception of Sierra Leone, there appeared to be little 
empirical evidence linking UN peacekeeping missions with high HIV prevalence; and AIDS awareness 
programmes in the military have significantly reduced the disparity in infection rates (de Waal 2005, 
McInnes 2006). Moreover, the causal links between HIV/AIDS and insecurity appear less robust. It is 
unclear how high HIV prevalence will transform societies; what intervening variables will determine 
the nature of such transformations; and how significant such transformations will be. Nor is it 
apparent that the weakness of a state’s armed forces is a causal agent in either internal or external 
aggression. It appears far more likely to be a contributory factor, and even then secrecy over combat 
readiness and HIV prevalence may limit the impression of weakness.  
          It is tempting to argue that some of the dangers identified have been averted through 
preventative action, not least AIDS awareness programmes; but in retrospect the case made in 2000 
was somewhat speculative, while worst case thinking and snowballing subsequently led these 
concerns to a position of orthodoxy which now appears less assured. This is not to say that HIV/AIDS 
does not create security problems. Indeed, as Laurie Garrett has commented, ‘the lack of 
demonstrable proof of a security threat currently in place against any given state, regional, or 
transnational system does not mean the danger is nonexistent, or that it will not emerge as a 
pandemic’(Garrett 2005: 15). Rather it is to suggest that the case is at the very least more complex 
than originally articulated, that the threat may be less direct.  
 
Bioterrorism  
The idea of using biological agents (or pathogens) to cause disease as a weapon of war goes back 
several hundred years, and was a major source of concern not least during the Cold War. Following 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the mailing of anthrax spores in the USA later that 
same year, the possibility of a major terrorist attack using biological or chemical weapons has 
loomed large in the minds of Western security analysts. In its assessment of risks to the USA through 
to 2020, for example, the CIA concluded that a terrorist attack using biological weapons represented 
a major threat (CIA 2005). This risk has forged a close link between public health and national 
security. The covert and potentially global nature of terrorist activities, the relative ease with which 
materials to produce such weapons can be acquired, and the comparative simplicity in their use, 
have created new risks. These cannot be addressed by military means alone and have led to a flurry 
of national, regional and international activity aimed both at preventing the development and use of 
such weapons, and at improving policy responses should they be deployed. Crucial to the latter has 
been the development of a closer relationship between national security and public health, using 
public health both as a defence against such attacks and conceivably as a deterrent to the use of 
such weapons.  
          Renewed concerns over biological weapons began to emerge in the early to mid-1990s, 
supported by intelligence reports of a potential proliferation of materials to produce such weapons 
following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Political and economic instability in the region, 
accompanied by growing lawlessness and the rise of organized criminal groups, raised fears that 
materials were being sold to terrorist organizations and ‘rogue states’ such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, 
Cuba and North Korea. Suspicions were already rife that Iraq had been stockpiling anthrax, 
botulinum toxin, smallpox and other agents prior to the Gulf War of 1991 to 1992. Of particular 
concern were the relatively low costs compared to other ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and their 
comparative ease of use, making them not only a cheap alternative to nuclear weapons for states 
but also accessible by sub-state groups including terrorist organizations. Moreover, the use of 
biological weapons by Iraq against its Kurdish population in 1988, the attempt by followers of 
Rajneesh Bhagwan to spread salmonella in the USA, and the attack on the Tokyo subway using sarin 
by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in 1995, suggested a willingness to use such weapons.  
          Even before the events of 11 September 2001 there was a growing discussion, in the USA and 
other major Western countries, between the public health and security communities, of the need to 
improve measures to prevent and respond to a major bio-terrorist attack. Efforts continued both to 
strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and to gain intelligence, not 
least on potential suppliers and their customers. Attention however was also focused on public 
defence: on how to improve response measures, recognizing that ‘we will not be able to prevent 
every act of BW (biological weapon) terrorism’ (Simon 1997: 428). Measures included drawing up 
contingency plans, identifying key targets, stockpiling vaccines and training key personnel.  
          The use of anthrax spores in letters to US news media and congressional offices shortly after 
9/11 however brought into sudden focus the potential risks from terrorists wielding biological 
weapons. Initially anthrax preoccupied popular attention, but fears of other infectious agents were 
soon raised. High among these was smallpox, already a concern of the US government which had 
ordered 40 million doses of vaccine in April 2001. These heightened concerns led to a step change in 
activity. At the national level, Western states examined their procedures for dealing with such 
attacks, most significantly with the 2002 signing of the US Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Bill formally placing public health in the realm of homeland security. US efforts to improve domestic 
capacity included improved inspections of food entering ports, tracking biological materials, 
strengthened communication networks, stockpiling vaccines, and the development of new 
medicines (Bush 2002). Other states including the UK, Canada and Australia explored similar 
domestic strategies. International cooperation was demonstrated by a series of meetings addressing 
response and preparedness, while the WHO encouraged states to strengthen both regional and 
global surveillance and response measures through the Global Outbreak Alert and Response 
Network (GOARN, later used successfully during the 2003 SARS outbreak). In addition, a wide range 
of studies were commissioned by governments and other organizations into how best to meet a 
bioterrorist attack. The unifying themes of these actions were that the risk of attacks on the West 
had greatly increased, and that public health would play a key role in defending against such attacks.  
          Three problems however have emerged in responding to the risk of bioterror. First, there have 
been clear tensions between an internationally versus domestically focused strategy. Following the 
anthrax attacks, the USA stepped up its stockpiling of the smallpox vaccine, soon joined by other 
countries including the UK. Given the large-scale purchasing by a few states of the vaccine, supplies 
worldwide were soon scarce. Similarly, worldwide supplies of the antibiotic Cipro used to treat 
anthrax rapidly became scarce. This national strategy of stockpiling vaccines raised international 
concerns over hoarding by a few states to the detriment of others. Tensions also arose over the US 
government’s decision to pull out of negotiations on the BWC. The priority of the USA appeared to 
be to focus on domestically based security measures, while others argued that a more international 
approach would yield better results.  
          This tension is also revealed in the second problem – whether it is better to try to prevent such 
attacks from happening or whether the priority should be on defence. The former suggests that 
attention should be given to international cooperation on intelligence and to the use of diplomatic 
efforts (including arms control) to make the supply and production of such weapons more difficult. 
In this, public health would be important in monitoring and surveillance of activities, but not the key 
element in an international strategy. The alternative approach however accepts that attacks are 
likely to be attempted and that a much more nationally focused strategy would be more 
appropriate. This would use domestic counter-terrorist agencies and ‘at the border controls’ to 
prevent biological weapons from entering the country, but would also make much greater use of 
public health systems in defending against such attacks.  
          The third problem is whether the risk has been overstated. Despite the comparatively recent 
use of such weapons in Iraq, Japan and the attempt to use salmonella in the USA, there remain 
doubts both over how easy it is for sub-state groups to gain access to or produce effective weapons 
and over how easy it is to use them in a manner which may cause significant loss of life. The failure 
to discover such weapons in Iraq only added to doubts over whether the extent of the problem had 
been overstated. Moreover, as Malcolm Dando has pointed out, using biological agents as weapons 
of mass destruction would require their use as an aerosol over large areas. The means to do this – 
especially against Western states – is almost wholly the preserve of states with relatively advanced 
militaries, not small terrorist groups (Dando 2005).  
 
A not so perfect partnership?  
Health affects every one of us – our state of well-being affects individual life, lifestyle and livelihood. 
Moreover, our health is often intertwined with that of the communities in which we are located, 
either geographically or as part of a socio-economic group. Poor communities, for example, are 
more likely to be at risk from TB; malaria is common in certain parts of the world but not in others. 
Thus health officials have long understood that well-being is as much socially determined as it is a 
bio-medical condition. These social determinants have an international dimension – infectious 
diseases, for example, can cross state boundaries. But the process of globalization has raised 
awareness that this international dimension is becoming more important and that the ability of 
national health services to protect their populations is partial in the face of such change. Health is 
therefore increasingly globalized (Lee 2003). With this recognition has come an increased interest on 
the part of the public health  
 
BOX 19.3 DANDO ON BIOTERRORISM  
There can be little doubt that a terrorist group at the present time could carry out some small to 
medium-scale biological weapons attacks. The situation in regard to a massive WMD aerosolised 
attack is quite different. All the technical literature and opinion maintain the view that although the 
problems of production and dissemination have been solved in state programmes in the past it is 
presently unlikely that a sub-state group would have the necessary capabilities and resources. 
(Dando 2005: 40)  
 
community in foreign and security policy – an awareness both of shared interests between these 
different communities and the possibilities of health issues gaining increased attention and 
resources through ‘piggy-backing’ on foreign and security policy. Simultaneous to this, security 
communities have become increasingly aware of health issues as security risks, most notably the 
three issues identified above. Thus the prospect has developed of a mutually beneficial partnership 
between health and security. For those on the security side of this partnership, health (and in 
particular public health) brings valuable tools and expertise to a range of novel problems; for those 
on the public health side, securitizing health raises its political profile, leading to the prospect of 
greater resources being devoted to urgent health needs.  
          This securitizing move is not unproblematic however. Three issues in particular have proved 
worrying, especially for the health side of the partnership. The first of these is: Who controls the 
agenda? At present it is clearly security policy, with global well-being lagging as a policy driver. The 
debate at present is dominated by those health risks which are seen as threatening the national 
interest, regional stability or international security; it is not about promoting a healthier world. Thus 
diseases which kill millions each year – including TB, malaria and diarrhoeal diseases – are not 
considered security risks, while bioterror (which does not rank on the list of major causes of 
nonnatural death) dominates. Moreover, it is an agenda dominated by the West – how international 
health issues threaten the security interests of the West – even though the majority of those who 
die of preventable illnesses do so outside the West. This is not to say that Western policy more 
generally does not have a humanitarian dimension, though the impact of policies tends to be 
limited. Rather it is to say that in securitizing health, the national security interests of the West have 
been prioritized over the human security of the poor elsewhere.  
          The next two problems both follow from this control of the agenda. The second is the relatively 
narrow range of issues which are considered part of the global health security agenda. Infectious 
diseases such as TB and malaria, as well as non-communicable diseases such as tobacco-related 
illnesses and cardiovascular disease, are not considered to be part of the agenda despite the fact 
that they kill millions each year and may be mitigated by concerted international action. Tobacco 
sales, for example, have increased dramatically as a consequence of Western-prompted policies on 
the liberalization of international trade. The UK MP Frank Dobson has referred to tobacco as a 
‘weapon of mass destruction’, but the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control provides only 
limited controls on the promotion and sale of tobacco. This is partly the result of the lack of an 
agreed conceptual basis for what is and what is not a global health security issue. But it is also a 
consequence of the third problem, that of the referent object – whose health is at risk and whose 
security? Despite health being a risk to individuals, the human security dimension has not been 
dominant. Rather, national security perspectives have prevailed. Tobacco is not considered a global 
health security issue because, despite the number of individuals who die from tobacco-related 
illnesses each year, there are no national security implications. On the other hand, although deaths 
from bioterrorism are speculative rather than real, the risk to national security is such that it is 
clearly entrenched on the agenda.  
 
Conclusion  
Over the past decade health issues have begun to appear on the security agenda. This has been 
aided by the post-Cold War shift away from military threats which pose a ‘clear and present danger’, 
to more diffuse and conceivably long-term risks. To date this attention has focused on three health-
related risks: the spread of infectious disease, HIV/AIDS, and bioterrorism. With the possible 
exception of bioterrorism, none of these yet dominate security agendas in the West, and indeed 
there are still debates there over whether global health security is more of an issue for international 
development policy than for national security; but elsewhere in the world, particularly in those areas 
where HIV/AIDS prevalence is high, the risk to states is much more serious, while from a human 
security perspective, health risks rank among the highest causes of non-natural death. The agenda to 
date however has been dominated by national security concerns, and particularly those of the West, 
such that the WHO’s term ‘global health security’ is in danger of meaning the national security of 
Western states from health risks rather than the promotion of wellbeing globally.  
 
Notes  
[1] I would like to thank Kelley Lee for her advice and willingness to discuss with me many of the 
issues discussed in this chapter.  
[2] UNAIDS produces an annual update on HIV/AIDS infections available on its website, 
http://unaids.org/en/. Estimating the number of cases of HIV infection is notoriously difficult, not 
least because of the social stigma associated with the disease in many parts of the world.  
[3] The Security Council session was followed by a special session of the General Assembly on 
HIV/AIDS in 2001.  
[4] In 1991 New York City Hospital reported a series of nosocomial outbreaks of multidrug-resistant 
TB (MDR TB). The city had already been experiencing a growth in TB associated with high numbers of 
people living with HIV/AIDS and immigrants to the USA.  
[5] Estimates at this stage are very uncertain and depend both on the effectiveness of public health 
responses and the nature of the mutation allowing the disease to spread – most mutations reduce 
the potency of a virus.  
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